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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FED ERA TED MILK PRODUCERS' 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STATEWIDE PLUMBING AND 
HEATING CO., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 
9214 
Respondent, Federated Milk Producers' Association, here-
inafter referred to as plaintiff or Federated, sued Appellant 
Statewide Plumbing and Heating Co., hereinafter referred to 
as defendant or Statewide, and West Jordan, Inc., for property 
damage sustained by reason of an accident which occurred 
on Redwood Road at about 8700 South in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, on the early morning of June 13, 1958. During the 
course of the trial, Federated voluntarily dismissed the action 
as against the defendant West Jordan, Inc. 
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Federated cannot agree with the statement of facts con-
tained in Statewide's brief, and so to more accurately state 
the facts and to supplement the same, the following is respect-
fully submitted. 
On June 12, 1958, Statewide commenced the construction 
of a sewer line along the east side of Redwood Road in the 
vicinity of 8700 South. The operation consisted of digging a 
trench by means of a trenching machine and depositing the 
dirt from the trench along the east one-half of Redwood Road 
so that it entirely blocked the one lane provided for northbound 
traffic (R. 154, 167 and 173-Exhibits 2 and 3). 
The only signs warning of any construction on the road 
in the area were located some two and one-half to three blocks 
south of the windro'v of dirt obstructing the roadway. These 
consisted of two signs, one reading HConstruction Slow," and 
the other read ((One Lane Traffic." They were placed off the 
east edge of the roadway near 9000 South Street and one of 
them had a singe flare pot in front of it (R. 83). There was 
no obstruction on the roadway for the two-tenths of a mile 
between these signs and the windrow of dirt where the accident 
occurred ( R. 8 3) . 
The roadway surface was dry black top (R. 85 and 87). 
The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour (R. 100 and 106). 
The weather was clear (R. 86). It was extremely dark on 
this night and the only illumination in the area were street 
lights of the old fashioned type with 150 watt bulbs screwed 
into a receptacle attached to every other light pole. The nearest 
street light to the place of the accident was 80 to 85 feet 
south of the impact area (R. 87 and 156). It was so dark that 
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witness Paskett walked direct! y through the barrow pit or 
ditch filled with milk which he couldn't see (R. 171). Witness 
Seal said he was unable to read the white lettering on Fede-
rated's truck (R. 156 and 167). 
At approxin1ately 2:48 A.M. on the morning of the 
accident, Federated's employee, Carman C. Jensen, was driving 
a 1956 International Diesel Tank Truck north along Redwood 
Road, having entered this roadway at about 14000 South 
Street (R. 112, 114 and 115). He was traveling approximately 
30 to 35 miles per hour (R. 117 and Exhibit No. 8). Jensen 
does not remernber seeing any signs indicating the road was 
blocked ahead and did not observe the obstruction in the road-
way until his truck was about 75 to 100 feet south of the pile 
of dirt and trencher situated in the lane for northbound traffic 
(R. 115). There was another vehicle approaching Jensen at 
this time and it was traveling south in the opposite lane of 
traffic. Jensen dimmed the lights on the truck as he approached 
this oncoming vehicle (R. 115 and 116). Just after passing 
this vehicle, Jensen observed the dirt obstructing his lane of 
traffic and he im1nediately applied his brakes and swerved to 
his left in an effort to avoid the obstruction (R. 117). Jensen 
\Vas unsuccessful in a voiding the dirt and as the truck struck 
the obstruction, the load of milk shifted and caused the truck 
to slowly overturn (R. 117). Jensen testified that the head-
lights of the oncoming vehicle interferred with his vision and 
until a moment after it passed his truck, he could not see the 
obstruction ahead (R. 119, 134 and 151). 
The investigating police officer measured the roadway 
to be 33 feet in width with 3 foot shoulders (R. 84 and 85). 
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The windrow of dirt was 4 to 5 feet high, about 165 feet in 
length, and came within 6 inches of the center line of the 
roadway so as to block the lane for northbound traffic (R. 84, 
85, 86, 108 and 131, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4). There were no flare 
pots burning to warn traffic approaching from the south of 
the presence of the dirt obstructing the northbound lane of 
traffic. The flare pots there were cold and without oil (R. 91, 
92, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 171 and 172 
-Exhibits 2 and 3) . The one flare pot burning was on the 
roadway at the north end of the windrow of dirt and could 
not be seen by anyone approaching from the south (R. 165 
and 166). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the issues were submitted 
by the trial court to the jury and a verdict was rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff Federated and against the defendant 
Statewide for the sum of $8657.10, and Judgment on Verdict 
was entered for that amount (R. 62 and 63). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS A COR· 
RECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE FACTS 
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OF THIS CASE AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO TI-fE 
DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Tt-IE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY. 
The 1ssues of negligence and contributory negligence 
were proper! y submitted to the jury as questions of fact. The 
defendant has cited several Utah cases in support of its First 
Point, however, none of these cases have fact situations similar 
to the instant case, with the exception of Fretz vs. Anderson, 
5 Utah 2d 290, 300 Pac. 2d 642. In O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 
Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791, the facts clearly indicated that the 
automobile crashing into the barricade had defective head-
lights. The testimony of the plaintiff's son who was driving 
the automoible in that case was to the effect that a type of 
shade or cover was placed over part of the headlight to lower 
the beam to the pavement and effectually decreased the range 
of the headlights. The evidence indicated that the beam fron1 
the headlights was not of sufficient distance to conform to 
state statute. Had the plaintiff's automobile headlights been 
properly adjusted as required by law, the driver likely should 
have seen the barricade in time to stop. Unlike our case at hand, 
the facts of the O'Brien case clearly show there was nothing 
of any nature to limit or interfere with the driver's vision 
other than defective headlights. Under such a state of facts, 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court correct! y held the driver of the automobile guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
In the case of Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., 
80 Utah 331, 15 Pac. 2d 309, this court held that a driver 
unable to stop his vehicle to avoid an obstruction within the 
distance lighted by his headlamps is guilty of negligence. 
Under the facts of the Dalley case, there was no excuse for 
the driver of the automobile not seeing the obstruction in the 
highway. This court again affirmed the rule that a motorist 
is normally required to operate his automobile so he can see 
and avoid substantial discernable objects in the road ahead. 
We have no quarrel with defendant's argument that ccwhile 
numerous exceptions have already been carved out of the 
original statement of the rule, it nevertheless is still controlling 
case law." (Brief of Appellant, Page 9). Given the same set 
of facts as those established in the Dalley case, the same 
conclusion would probably be reached today. The defendant 
recognizes that there are exceptions to this rule. One of these 
exceptions has been applied in the case of Fretz vs. Anderson, 
supra. In this case, unlike those previously cited, the plaintiff 
driver was troubled by interference with her vision from the 
lights of a truck parked on the edge of the highway and 
facing in her direction. She stated that she was temporarily 
blinded by these headlights, and immediately upon seeing the 
obstruction in the highway, applied her brakes but did not 
have sufficient time in which to stop her automobile. This 
court, speaking through Chief Justice McDonough, said at 
page 298: 
CCThe rule that a motorist is normally required to 
so operate his machine as to be able to see and avoid 
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substantial discernable objects in the road ahead is 
generally recognized, as is its concommittant that the 
motorist must equip his machine with proper head-
lights and be able to stop within the distance of the 
light's projection. However, this does not mean that 
a motorist striking an object in the highway is guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law under any and all 
conditions." 
This court then said, in reference to the case of N ikoleropoulos 
vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 304: 
((But this case has been modified by subsequent cases 
permitting the jury to determine, in the light of existing 
conditions, what a reasonable and prudent person would 
do under the circumstances." (Italics ours). 
In the instant case, defendant, in support of its argument, 
states that the plaintiff's driver admittedly was not ((blinded" 
by the oncoming headlights nor was the approaching car a 
((sudden or unanticipated'' interference. Considering this 
problem, the court said on page 299 of the Fretz case: 
ttHowever, as respondent points out, neither the fog 
in the Trimble case nor the curve in the Hodges case 
were unforeseeable, and in those cases the motorist 
was not required to stop but merely to exercise more 
than ordinary amount of care." 
The court then refers to an extensive annotation on the subject 
cited in 22 ALR 2d 297. The very problem we have in the 
instant case was considered in the case of Frowd vs. March-
bank, 154 Wash. 634, 283 Pac. 467. In that case the Wash-
ington court stated: 
tt ••• the trial court held, if we have correctly gath-
ered its meaning, that the negligence of the appellant 
consisted in driving past an automobile whose lights 
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obscured the vtston of the highway behind it. But 
everyone who has driven an automobile in the night 
time, and every observant person who has ridden in 
an automobile in the nighttime and has met an oncom-
ing automobile with burning lights, knows that the 
lights obscure objects behind it for a considerable 
distance before the automobile is reached until a time 
after its lights are past, and to say that it is negligence 
to drive past an automobile in such a situation is 
practically to say that it is negligence to drive along 
the highway in the nighttime at all. It must be remem-
bered that both automobiles are in the same situation, 
and, if one must stop, so must the other, and, if the 
rule stated by the court is to be applied, it would 
require some rather intricate maneuvering for the one 
to get by the other without violating the law ... " 
This Court recognized· the sound reasoning contained in the 
above quotation from the F rowd case, by adopting the same 
verbatim in the Fretz case, and concluding therefrom, at page 
300: 
~'The jury determined that her conduct was reason-
able under the circumstances and we feel that the law 
lays no heavier duty upon her." 
Thus, there need not be a sudden or unexpected interference 
with the vision of plaintiff's driver to create a question of fact 
for the jury in determining the possible contributory negli-
gence of this driver. Defendant has stated at page 10 of its 
brief: 
''Where such headlights are dimmed as required by 
law, they cannot on any logical basis furnish an excuse 
for failing to see otherwise obvious obstructions upon 
the highway." 
This court has specifically held to the contrary in the Fretz 
case. 
10 
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Although the evidence in our instant case shows there 
was a sign to the south of the scene of the accident indicating 
one lane traffic ahead, plaintiff's driver traveled one-fifth of 
a mile without observing anything on the highway, nor was 
there any indication as to which lane of traffic was obstructed. 
The fact there was an approaching car from the other direction 
was not controlling. Plaintiff's driver had no more reason to 
anticipate that his lane of traffic would be blocked than did 
the approaching driver. 
The case of Kansas Transit Transport Company vs. 
Browning, 219 Fed. 2d 890, and cited by the defendant, is 
not a case followed by the rna jority of the jurisdictions in the 
United States. This case follo\vs the principle that there must 
be a sudden and unexpected blinding to relieve the driver of 
an automobile from being charged with contributory negFgence 
as a matter of law. Our court has expressly refused to follow 
this rule. Fretz vs. Anderson, supra. 
In the case of Artz vs. Herrera, 325 Pac. 2d 927, the 
Colorado Court, according to defendant's own admission in its 
brief at page 13, held that it was a question of fact for the 
jury on negligence and contributory negligence, when a driver's 
vision is obscured or interfered with by approaching lights. The 
Colorado Court also recognized that there is a partial obstruc-
tion of vision by oncoming headlights. Accordingly, plaintiff 
respectfully submits that visual interference from approaching 
nighttime traffic can reasonably be anticipated but the action 
of any driver under the circumstances is to be measured in 
light of the reasonable prudent man rule and should be sub-
mitted to the jury for determination. 
11 
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In our instant case, the issues of negligence and con-
tributory negligence were clearly defined and subn1itted to 
the jury. The jury found from the conflicting evidence, that 
the defendant negligently failed to properly light the \vindrov~, 
of dirt obstructing the northbound lane of traffic, that plaintiff's 
driver was not contributorily negligent in colliding 'vith said 
Y=vrindrow of dirt, and that defendant's negligence was the 
sole and proximate cause of the accident. This court has 
repeatedly held the question of contributory negligence is 
usually for the jury, and that before such issue may be taken 
from the jury, defendant's burden of proving both that plaintiff 
v1as guilty of contributory negligence, and that such negligence 
proxitnately contributed to cause his own injury, must be met 
and established with such certainty that reasonable minds 
could not differ and find to the contrary. If there is any reason-
able basis upon which reasonable minds might conclude that 
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence, 
either that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or 
that such negligence proximately cont~ibuted to cause the 
injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question subm1tted 
to the jury. See Martin vs. Stephens, 121 Utah 484, 243 Pac. 
2d 747. The jury found defendant negligent and plaintiff free 
of contributory negligence. This court has on numerous occa-
sions held that the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury 
verdict, in a law action, must be viewed in a light most favor-
able to the prevailing party. Ivy vs. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d, 
Page 5, 3 36 Pac. 2d 781; Niemann vs. Grand Central Market 
Inc., 9 Utah 2d 46, 337 Pac. 2d 424; Ostertag vs. Lamont, 9 
Utah 2d 130, 339 Pac. 2nd 1022. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that under the facts of the 
12 
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instant case there was a question of contributory negligence 
to be determined by the jury. The jury's determination was in 
favor of the plaintiff and their finding should not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
POINT II 
Tl-IE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS A COR-
RECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The trial court's instruction No. 10 was not erroneous 
nor prejudicial to the defendant. It was a pronouncement of 
the general rule set forth in the Dalley case coupled with the 
exceptions placed on this rule in the Fretz case. It presented 
both plaintiffs and defendant's theory of the case but allowed 
the jury to make the final determination of the facts. 
The second paragraph of the instruction was not in any 
way a comment upon the evidence but merely a statement of 
fact common to the knowledge of all drivers of automobiles. 
The trial court quoted directly from Fretz vs. Anderson, supra, 
in formulating this instruction. Defendant contends that this 
was an expression of opinion by the trial court on a disputed 
fact, yet on page 10 of its brief states: 
CtSome interference from the headlights of oncoming 
cars is reasonably to be expected during nighttime 
travel." 
Courts often take judicial notice of things which are of 
common knowledge. See 9B Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law and Practice, Permanent Edition, Pages 394 to 
13 
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401. The provisions of Title 78-21-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53, in part provides: 
((Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law 
made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such 
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it." 
Courts of other jurisdictions have taken judicial notice of 
the fact that headlights of oncoming vehicles interfere with 
the vision of the driver of a motor vehicle approaching the 
headlights. Long, et ux, vs. Hicks, Wash., 21 Pac. 2d 281; 
Herring vs. Holicer Gas Company, Inc., et al, La., 22 South-
ern 2d 868; Mallett vs. Southern Pacific Company, et al, Cal., 
68 Pac. 2d 281. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court was in 
no way commenting upon the evidence in our instant case but 
merely taking judicial notice of a fact commonly known to 
all drivers of automobiles, and the truth of which has been 
admitted by the appellant in its brief. The record is clear and 
without contradiction that the headlights of an approaching 
automobile interfered with the vision of plaintiff's driver. 
Appellant states at page 15 of its brief: 
t t By his own admission any interference by oncoming 
lights did not affect his vision." 
The record will readily disclose that this is an incorrect state-
ment of the evidence. The driver of plaintiff's truck stated 
on several occasions that the headlights of the oncoming auto-
mobile interfered with his vision (R. 119,134,142 and 151). 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is without dispute that an oncoming auto-
mobile had its headlights burning and those headlights inter-
fered with and partially obstructed the view of plaintiffs 
driver. The defendant admitted having placed the windrow of 
dirt in the road. Plaintiff's witnesses, including those residing 
in homes adjoining the scene of the accident, testified that 
they did not observe any burning flare pots in or near the 
windrow of dirt on the night in question. The issue of de-
fendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence 
were clearly raised by the evidence and were properly sub-
mitted to the jury for their determination. Defendant would 
have this court so construe the Dalley case as to formulate 
a rule that would ,without exception, declare every nighttime 
driver involved in an automobile accident guilty of negligence 
for driving upon a street or highway in which there were auto-
mobiles approaching from the opposite direction. The sound 
reasoning in the Fretz case clearly establishes the fallacy of 
this argument. Defendant further advocates that this court 
forbid a trial court from taking judicial notice of a fact com-
monly known to automobile drivers. Trial courts have been 
empowered with the authority to acknowledge a commonly 
known fact. The fact that an automobile approaching in the 
nighttime with headlights burning impairs the vision of a 
driver is a fact as commonly known to passengers and operators 
of automobiles who have been upon the highway in the night-
time as the fact that snow on the highway makes the same 
slippery. Plaintiff respectfully submits that such an instruction 
is the law and could in no way be prejudical to the defendant. 
15 
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The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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